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I
From a his tor i cal per spec tive the ques tions that oc cupy the cen ter stage of con tem po rary an a lytic ju ris pru dence are some thing of a new comer. The phi los o phy of law has been tra di tion ally un der stood as a nor ma tive en ter prise with close re la tions with moral and po lit i cal phi los o phy. This is true of both those the o rists now clas si fied as nat u ral lawyers as it is of those now con sid ered early ex po nents of legal pos i tiv ism. The twen ti eth cen tury has seen a rad i cal trans for ma tion of this un der stand ing of ju ris pru dence is about. Fol low ing the very in flu en tial work of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart many le gal phi los o phers, es pe cially (but not ex clu sively) le gal positivists, have be gun to think that the pri mary task of ju ris pru dence is de scrip tive. Ac cord ing to this view, which I will call "descriptivism," ju ris pru dence is first a con cep tual in quiry con cerned with of fer ing an account of the "na ture of law," it is gen eral in the sense that it is ap pli ca ble to all le gal sys tems, and it is mor ally neu tral in that it does not pass judg ment on whether law (ei ther in gen eral or any of its par tic u lar instantiations) is mor ally good or bad. Descriptivists do not deny, of course, that it is pos si ble to talk about spe cific laws and to pass moral judgment on them, but they in sist that descriptivism is both pos si ble and that it is a valu able in tel lec tual pur suit. Some fur ther ar gue that the de scrip tive in quiry is log i cally prior to the nor ma tive one. Their op po nents chal lenge ei ther one of the two el e ments that make up descriptivism, in sist ing that it is im pos si ble to give an ac count of law that is both gen eral and does not ap peal to moral con sid er ations, and they deny the claim that to the ex tent one can de scribe law, this in quiry en joys log i cal pri or ity to nor ma tive ques tions. Though descriptivism has not been uni ver sally ac cepted, it re mains, I think, the more pop u lar view among contempora-ry le gal phi los o phers. 1 In this es say I chal lenge descriptivism by ar gu ing that it is in con sis tent with the na ture of ju ris pru den tial de bates.
II
There are on go ing de bates among le gal phi los o phers that pur port to be about the na ture of law. By this I do not re fer to de bates among law yers about the "grounds" of law in a given le gal sys tem, but to the de bates among le gal phi los ophers them selves about the cor rect ac count of the na ture of law. 2 At their nar row est these the o ries pur port to be "descrip tive" in that they seek to of fer an ex pla na tion or ex plica tion of what law while leav ing open the ques tion of whether (or when) law is a good or a bad thing. If true, a de scrip tive the ory of law could be ac cepted both by the com mit ted legalist and the philo soph i cal an ar chist. But these the o ries are also de scrip tive in an other, though related, sense. They are said to be de scrip tive also in that they pur port to tell us what law is with out ap peal to nor mative con sid er ations, or at least with out ap peal to prac ti cal (moral or po lit i cal) nor ma tive con sid er ations. For con venience I will call the nor ma tive con sid er ations descriptivists al low "non-moral con sid er ations." The aim of such an inquiry is to iden tify what law is, to be able to pro vide a good classi fi ca tory scheme for dis tin guish ing those things that are law from those things that are not. The re stric tion of the in quiry to non-moral con sid er ations is there to iden tify the ob ject of in quiry in an ob jec tive fash ion, not un like scien tists' iden ti fi ca tion of the na ture of phys i cal sub stances. And it is ex actly for this rea son that the find ings are descrip tive also in the first sense: just as the cor rect iden ti fica tion of the phys i cal struc ture of say, wa ter, does not pass judg ment on whether wa ter is a good or a bad thing, so does the cor rect iden ti fi ca tion of the na ture of law re main si lent on whether hav ing law is good or bad.
There are dif fer ences among the var i ous de fenses of descriptivism. One dif fer ence in par tic u lar is of sig nif i cance for my ar gu ment: some descriptivists con tend that they describe "the con cept of law," while oth ers claim to ex plain "the na ture of law," or "law it self." The dis tinc tion is of ten elided -Hart, to take one prom i nent ex am ple, freely moved be tween talk ing about "the con cept of law" and the "na ture of law"-but it will prove im por tant. By the "con cept" of law I re fer to some thing like peo ple's be liefs about law, roughly along the sense psy chol o gists use the term con cept; by "nature", I re fer to the prac tice it self. The ar gu ment I de velop be low is con cerned with those the o rists who pur port to expli cate the na ture of law. 3 It is this un der stand ing of de -scrip tive ju ris pru dence that is dif fi cult to rec on cile with the fact of per sis tent dis agree ment.
III
My ar gu ment, in brief, is that the ex is tence and per sistence of dis agree ments over the na ture of law gives us reason to doubt the claim that ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments are in fact de scrip tive in the sense iden ti fied above. Now, un ques tion ably, that dis agree ments ex ist over a de scrip tive ques tion is not im me di ately a cause for con cern, nor is it a rea son to doubt the de scrip tive ness of the ques tion. I may dis agree with you on what I take to be an un ques tion ably de scrip tive ques tion, say, the height of the Em pire State Build ing. The straight for ward ex pla na tion for our dis agreement is, typ i cally, at least one of us is mis taken. It is also typ i cal of such dis agree ments, how ever, that they are not per sis tent; all we need to do is find a source we ac cept as au thor i ta tive on the mat ter, con sult it and find who of us (if any) is right.
The mere fact of per sis tence also does not au to mat i cally war rant the con clu sion that the dis agree ments are not descrip tive; but it does call for an ex pla na tion. As I see it, there are four po ten tial ex pla na tions for per sis tent disagree ments that are con sis tent with descriptivism. I call the first epistemic de fi ciency. In cases of epistemic de fi ciency there is in suf fi cient data on a mat ter un der con sid er ation re sult ing in gaps that leave room for sev eral com pet ing descrip tive ac counts. Cur rently, for ex am ple, there is disagree ment among evo lu tion ary the o rists on what pro vides a better ac count of the pro cess of nat u ral se lec tion, whether it is through slow, rel a tively con stant, changes (a view called "grad u al ism"), or whether it is in spurts of rel a tively quick change fol lowed by pe riod of rel a tive sta sis (this is known as the "punc tu ated equi lib ria" view). This is, at its core, an em pir i cal ques tion, but it is one for which much of the rel e vant ev i dence is not avail able. If better data on Earth's nat u ral his tory were avail able, sci en tists would be able to an swer which of these two (if any) is cor rect. While the de bate in this ex am ple is still open, the his tory of science pro vides nu mer ous ex am ples of sci en tific dis putes that were re solved once more ev i dence be came avail able.
The sec ond pos si ble ex pla na tion for per sis tent de scrip tive dis agree ments is the com plex ity of the ob ject. The idea here is quite straight for ward: The com plex ity of the ob ject of inquiry makes it dif fi cult to pro vide an ac cu rate de scrip tion of it, hence the po ten tial for per sis tent dis agree ments. Ap plied to the do main of ju ris pru dence, dis agree ments over what law is ex ist and per sist be cause the sub ject-mat ter to be explained -law-is very com plex and dis agree ments re sult from the o rists' end less strug gle to get a better grasp of le gal phe nom ena.
A third pos si ble source of per sis tent de scrip tive dis agreements may be, ex plic itly or im plic itly, the re sult of dis agreement over val ues. I as sume that even the most com mit ted moral re al ist will ad mit that there are per sis tent dis agreements over moral ques tions and that there is cur rently no agreed method of re solv ing them. As a re sult, evaluative dis agree ments are dif fi cult to re solve and are typ i cally persis tent. Call these "moral evaluative dis agree ments." On some metaethical views moral evaluative dis agree ments are the re sult of epistemic de fi ciency on moral mat ters, but for the mo ment I will as sume this is not the case. For those who be lieve that the source of dis agree ment on moral matters is epistemic, moral evaluative dis agree ments are therefore a spe cial case of what I called epistemic de fi ciency. (I say some thing about this pos si bil ity be low.)
The fi nal pos si ble source of per sis tent dis agree ment consis tent with descriptivism is what I call ap par ent dis agreement. Ap par ent dis agree ments ex ist when, de spite ap pear -ances and dis pu tants' own be liefs, they do not in fact talk about the same thing. For ex am ple, if two peo ple dis agree over whether Dworkin thinks peo ple have a right to por nogra phy, their dis agree ment may be due to the fact that one is talk ing about Ron ald while the other about Andrea. Though fa ce tious, this ex am ple high lights an im por tant point about ap par ent dis agree ments, namely that though def i nitely pos si ble, ap par ent dis agree ments are less likely to per sist as usu ally their na ture can be dis cov ered fairly quickly. In deed, those cases in which dis agree ments of this type per sist are likely to be cases of epistemic de fi ciency that leads dis pu tants to mis tak enly treat two dif fer ent things as though they were one (or as two dif fer ent to kens of a sin gle type). As such, the only real cases of this source of dis agree ment are typ i cally go ing to be, once again, a special case of the first source of per sis tent dis agree ment identi fied above. Nev er the less, be cause this case calls for some in de pend ent con sid er ation, I will con sider ap par ent disagreements sep a rately be low.
It is time to ad vance my ar gu ment against descriptivism. In a nut shell, it is that descriptivism is a true and sig nif i cant re search pro gram for ju ris pru dence only if the source of disagree ment among le gal phi los o phers is epistemic de fi ciency or com plex ity; but nei ther is a plau si ble ex pla na tion of ju rispru den tial dis agree ments. Hence, ju ris pru den tial descriptivism is ei ther false or point less. Let me now try and substan ti ate this ar gu ment.
IV
I start with the ex pla na tion that seems most ob vi ously in con sis tent with descriptivism, namely that ju ris pru dential dis agree ments per sist be cause, at bot tom, they are disagree ments over moral evaluative ques tions. The one great vir tue of this pos si bil ity is that it pro vides an easy an swer to the puz zle of per sis tent ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments; on the other hand, this an swer seems in con sis tent, in a fairly ob vi ous man ner, with descriptivism. This can be fairly eas ily seen if we think of Dworkin's chal lenge to le gal pos itiv ism. In many of Dworkin's writ ings he fo cused on the fact of dis agree ment within the law (i.e., not the dis agreements I am con cerned with here) as an em bar rass ment to posi tiv ist the o ries of law, and for which Dworkin's view of law as a do main of moral de ci sion-mak ing of fered a ready an swer. Mov ing this ar gu ment to the level of ju ris pru den tial dis cus sion does not, at first sight, make any dif fer ence. That seems to have been Dworkin's own view, as in his later writ ings he re lied on some thing like this ar gu ment in sup port of the view that le gal phi los o phy is evaluative. 4 If we ac cept that the rea son why ju ris pru den tial dis agreements per sist is be cause they are moral, does this not imme di ately show that descriptivism is false?
One way of try ing to over come this chal lenge is to adopt the view that descriptivism re quires only de scrib ing evaluative judg ments, not mak ing a moral ar gu ment or taking a stand on an evaluative ques tion. Such an ar gu ment has been made for the sake of ex plain ing how ju ris prudence can re main de scrip tive in the con text of con sid er ing evaluative judg ments within the law. As Hart put it, "[d]escription may still be a de scrip tion, even when what is de scribed is an eval u a tion". 5 But what ever are the mer its of this view in the con text of le gal phi los o phers' de scrib ing the at ti tudes of those who take part in le gal prac tice, 6 this argu ment can not be used when evaluative pre mises are, ex hypothesi, the source of the dis agree ment among le gal the orists. In such a case if one can de scribe such evaluative atti tudes in a mor ally neu tral man ner, then we would not expect to see dis agree ment. If dis agree ments per sist when de scrib ing a moral at ti tude, we are once again fac ing the prob lem of ex plain ing per sis tent dis agree ments. In deed, an ad mis sion that such dis agree ments are pos si ble may be a rea son for doubt ing the claim that it is pos si ble to de scribe a nor ma tive at ti tude neu trally.
An other pos si bil ity might be to ar gue that the sup posed con trast be tween evaluative and de scrip tive dis agree ments is mis lead ing, be cause evaluative dis agree ments may be descrip tive. To say of a sen tence that it is evaluative, on this view, is to say that it re lates to ques tions of value, i.e. it is to say some thing about the ref er ence of the sen tence. To say of a sen tence that it is de scrip tive, on the other hand, is to say some thing about its na ture, to say, roughly, that it is about a mat ter of fact. On this view, it is pos si ble for a sentence to be evaluative (re fer ring to value) and de scrip tive (fac tual) at the same time if we be lieve that there are facts "in the world" on mat ters of value. 7 Would ac cept ing this pos si bil ity sal vage de scrip tive ju rispru dence? As a his tor i cal mat ter, "de scrip tive ju ris prudence" is as so ci ated with le gal pos i tiv ism, and the lat ter has been at trac tive to some le gal the o rists, most fa mously H. L. A. Hart, who were skep ti cal of claims of the de scriptive ness of eth ics, and whom I sus pect may have been attracted to de scrip tive ju ris pru dence ex actly be cause it was grounded on the firmer fac tual ground of so cial prac tice than on that of mo ral ity. The point is, how ever, of in ter est be yond in tel lec tual his tory. De scrip tive ju ris pru dence was pre mised on the idea that it is pos si ble to give an ac count of le gal prac tice that is not grounded in mo ral ity, that ju ris - pru den tial dis putes were about the "classi fi ca tory" ques tion of what counted as law. The pos si bil ity con sid ered here con cedes that ju ris pru den tial de bates are, at least in part, moral or po lit i cal de bates in dis guise, but then tries to salvage descriptivism by ap peal ing to a con tro ver sial metaethical the ory. Even if this the ory is ac cepted, it is doubt ful whether it leaves more than the shell of descriptivism. Descriptivism is based on the view that law is a so cial prac tice and as such ex pli ca ble as a mat ter of fact. On the re in ter pre ta tion un der con sid er ation, it turns out that this is false. To ac cept this ex pla na tion for the persis tence of ju ris pru den tial de bates is to ad mit what has always been un der stood (by pro po nents and chal leng ers of descriptivism alike) to be the an tith e sis of descriptivism, namely that ju ris pru den tial de bates re ally are moral or polit i cal dis putes in dis guise. What does not change is that the dis agree ment is per sis tent and its per sis tence is due to the fact that ques tions of value are im pos si ble to re solve. To learn from a metaethical the ory that the de bate is nev er theless de scrip tive be cause ques tions of value are fac tual is small con so la tion in deed, if we can not in any way as cer tain them. Put some what dif fer ently, the mo ti va tion for ju ris pruden tial descriptivism has been the be lief that one need not en gage in eval u a tion in ju ris pru den tial in quiry. That motivation does not change when we dis cover that evaluative state ments are fac tual and there fore, in the sense used in this sec tion, "de scrip tive". V I turn to con sider the pos si bil ity that ju ris pru den tial disagree ments are ap par ent dis agree ments. This may seem a sur pris ing sug ges tion, for if true, that would im ply that many ju ris pru den tial de bates are in fact not gen u ine debates, that much time and ef fort has been spent on de bates in which dis pu tants are in fact ar gu ing past each other. An other rea son to doubt this ex pla na tion has much to do with ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment is that, as men tioned ear lier, we ex pect such dis agree ments to be re solved rather quickly, once the par ties re al ize they do not re ally dis agree. To be per sis tent on this ac count, it has to be the case that ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments are ap par ent but those who en gage in them do not (and per haps can not) learn this fact.
De spite its ap par ent odd ity, the sug ges tion that ju ris pruden tial dis agree ments are ap par ent should be fairly fa miliar. A com mon strat egy for ex plain ing away sev eral longstand ing ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments has been to ar gue that they are the re sult of ap par ent dis agree ment. It has been sug gested, for in stance, that nat u ral law yers are concerned with the case of moral or just law whereas le gal positivists seek to ex plain its less ex alted instantiations; or to pick an other well-known ex am ple, it has been sug gested that much of the dis agree ment be tween le gal positivists and Dworkin may sim ply re flect fail ure to no tice that positivists of fer a the ory of law and Dworkin a the ory of ad ju di ca tion. 8 The first thing to note about these sug ges tions is that they do not cor re spond to how nat u ral law yers or Dworkin under stand their own work: These crit ics of le gal pos i tiv ism clearly con sid ered their views a chal lenge to posi tiv ist views and when faced with such con cil ia tory sug ges tions they flatly re jected them. 9 But the is sue is not merely "bio graph ical." Af ter all, it is pos si ble that these the o rists have mis under stood their work or its im pli ca tions. The heart of the mat ter is that ex pla na tions of dif fer ent as pects of a sin gle phe nom e non are, if they are both true, com ple men tary; indeed, nec es sar ily so. Ex plain ing ju ris pru den tial dis agreement as the re sult of ap par ent dis agree ment of this sort requires us to ac cept that vir tu ally all le gal the o rists made not only the er ror of fail ing to no tice their ac counts dealt with dif fer ent mat ters, but also the fur ther er ror of find ing con flicts among them selves when none ex isted. While not im pos si ble, the sug ges tion that such global mis un der standing is at the heart of all de bates among le gal phi los o phers seems rather im plau si ble. What is even more cu ri ous is that such mis un der stand ings would per sist (on what is said to be a de scrip tive mat ter) even af ter the er ror has been pointed out. If that were the source of all ju ris pru dential dis agree ments, one would wish to see an ex pla na tion as to why so many in tel li gent le gal the o rists con tinue to get their own views so badly con fused.
While I do not find these par tic u lar ex am ples very compel ling, I nev er the less be lieve that ap par ent dis agree ments count for at least some per sis tent dis agree ment in ju ris prudence. The first im por tant source of ap par ent dis agree ment in ju ris pru dence is that le gal phi los o phers have dif fer ent views on what counts as law, what be longs to the ob ject to be ex plained. This is be cause dif fer ent le gal the o rists do not ap proach their the o ret i cal in qui ries with a clean slate; rather, they en ter into the de bate with dif fer ent as sumptions on the sort of things that be long to the ob ject of inquiry. Some le gal the o rists, to make this point less abstract, are pretheoretical "nat u ral law yers" and there fore do not in clude un just leg is la tive pre scrip tions as part of the ob ject to be ex plained while oth ers are pretheoretical "le gal positivists", who do. As a re sult of their dif fer ent start ing points, they end up with con flict ing de scrip tive the o ries, but be cause the dis agree ment ex ists at a level that can not be touched by their de scrip tive the o ries, the dis agree ments per sist. Apart from the prob lem of cir cu lar ity (what jus ti fies those pretheoretical start ing points?), to the ex tent that juris pru den tial dis agree ments are the re sult of such pretheoretical dis agree ments, it looks like no de scrip tive the ory can con vince those not al ready com mit ted to the start ing point it is based on, hence the per sis tence of (some) jurisprudential dis agree ments.
That is a se ri ous prob lem for descriptivism, and it is the re sult of the fact that un like in the case of sci en tific de -scrip tion, there is nei ther an agreed-upon "sam ple" on which dif fer ent the o rists can the o rize, nor an agreed-upon meth od ol ogy that can be used to de ter mine that sam ple with out bi as ing the con clu sion in fa vor of one ap proach. As a re sult, it is al ways pos si ble to dis miss any po ten tial counterexample to one's the ory as not re ally a case of law, some thing that each side can do since what counts as law is not fixed in ad vance. Even the choice of meth od ol ogy for fix ing the ob ject of in quiry is it self sus pect and po ten tially ques tion-beg ging for, once again, fa vor ing one con clu sion over oth ers. To give a con crete ex am ple: what role, if any, should pre vail ing at ti tudes among peo ple play in an swer ing the ques tion of the na ture of law? We can imag ine at least three dif fer ent an swers: ac cord ing to the first, pre vail ing atti tudes should play no role what so ever, for the philo soph ical in quiry into the na ture of law is en tirely sep a rate from the so cio log i cal one; ac cord ing to a sec ond, we should conduct sur veys to ex am ine peo ple's at ti tudes on the mat ter; and ac cord ing to a third, we should be in ter ested in people's at ti tudes on the mat ter, but there is no need for surveys be cause the phi los o pher can rely on him self and his own ex pe ri ences as a guide for this ques tion. (There are, of course, other pos si bil i ties and vari a tions on these three basic types.) Fur ther com pli cat ing the mat ter is the fact that these po si tions can re late to two lev els of in quiry, that of set ting the ob ject of in quiry and that of pro vid ing the ex plan atory (or de scrip tive) the ory. There are, there fore, at least six meth od olog i cal po si tions, and dif fer ent le gal the o rists have ex pressed dif fer ent views on the choice among them. And yet, un til we have been given a rea son to fa vor one an swer over oth ers, the pros pects for de scrip tive ju ris pru dence that does not beg all im por tant ques tions look grim. Cru cially for our pur poses, the ques tion of the choice be tween these pos si bil i ties can not it self be con sid ered "de scrip tive".
To avoid talk ing past each other le gal phi los o phers will have to agree on a "de scrip tive" (in this con text: nor ma tively neu tral) way of de cid ing what counts as law prior to be gin -ning their the o riz ing. It is not clear how they can do that, when the ques tion what counts as law is ex actly what the point of con ten tion among them. What is likely to hap pen is that each side will fa vor the meth od ol ogy that fits its precon cep tions. In fact, I be lieve this is ex actly what has happened: much of the de bate be tween le gal positivists and anti-positivists these days re volves im plic itly around the ques tion whether the ques tion of the na ture of law is a ques tion about ex plain ing a so cial prac tice, or is part of a broader in quiry that in volves ad dress ing ques tions about na ture and hu man na ture. 10 If one adopts the for mer approach, the con clu sion that law is a "so cial con struc tion," now a days taken by many le gal positivists to be the core of their view, fol lows al most in ev i ta bly. If one adopts the lat ter ap proach, that con clu sion ap pears, at the very least, incom plete.
This prob lem can be gen er al ized: a cen tral rea son why juris pru den tial dis agree ments per sist is be cause of un der lying meth od olog i cal is sues: the point of ju ris pru dence and phi los o phy, the na ture of ex pla na tion in gen eral and of social phe nom ena in par tic u lar. These are wide-rang ing issues, but if they have one thing in com mon is that none of them can be called "de scrip tive" (I re turn to this is sue below).
An other pos si ble source of ap par ent dis agree ment in juris pru dence is mis taken gen er al iza tions. The prob lem here is that in spite of le gal phi los o phers' claims to gen er al ity, they are in fact of ten er ro ne ously try ing to gen er ate an account of the "na ture" of law in gen eral from the few le gal sys tems they hap pen to be fa mil iar with, de spite the fact that dif fer ent le gal sys tems -con trary to descriptivists' assump tions-do not share a sin gle na ture. On this view, dis agree ment may be the re sult of dif fer ent gen er al iza tions based on dif fer ent phe nom ena. Though this pos si bil ity is of ten dis missed out of hand by descriptivists, I think some -thing like it ex plains some ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments. There are fun da men tal dif fer ences be tween dif fer ent le gal sys tems that re flect dif fer ent un der stand ings of what law is (dif fer ences that ul ti mately arise from dif fer ent nor ma tive views on the role of law, as well as dif fer ences in the so cial, po lit i cal, and tech no log i cal en vi ron ment), and that some of the dis agree ments among le gal phi los o phers, as well as their per sis tence, are the re sult of fail ure to take such differ ences into ac count. 11 Those who re ject this claim may raise two valid challenges: First, to claim that dif fer ent le gal sys tems be long to dif fer ent kinds must pre sup pose some way of in di vid u at ing le gal sys tems, some thing that the ar gu ments about cir cular ity men tioned ear lier pre clude. Even if this prob lem is over come, a sec ond chal lenge arises, namely, why would such dis agree ments per sist when the in for ma tion on the local ity of ex pla na tion is readily avail able? The brief an swer to the first chal lenge is that it is pos si ble to in di vid u ate legal sys tems to dif fer ent "types" on evaluative grounds, i.e. ex actly in a way that is not avail able to the descriptivist. My re sponse to the sec ond chal lenge is the "so cio log i cal" ob serva tion that most le gal phi los o phers, and es pe cially so these days, do not seem par tic u larly in ter ested in ac tual law beyond their (of ten lim ited) knowl edge of their own le gal system, nor do they take par tic u lar in ter est in those dis ciplines (com par a tive law, le gal an thro pol ogy, and le gal his tory) that pro vide the rel e vant in for ma tion for as sess ing such a claim.
I do not want to spend too much time on this is sue or press it too strongly, be cause the rel e vance of this ob ser vation is tan gen tial for the mat ter at hand. If I am wrong about it, that sim ply means that one po ten tial source for ex plain ing the source of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment is un avail able. If it is true, descriptivism may re main a vi a ble pos si bil ity on a more lo cal level, once we dis tin guish between the dif fer ent phe nom ena put to gether un der the same la bel, "law." But even if we ac cept this pos si bil ity, the dif fi cul ties for descriptivism are far from over. First, de ciding whether two dif fer ent phe nom ena are two to kens of the same type is not some thing that can be done by mere obser va tion and de scrip tion, as dif fer ent phe nom ena in the world do not come with la bels at tached to them. There fore, adopt ing this as an ex pla na tion for ju ris pru den tial disagree ment will re quire jus ti fy ing which of the dif fer ences be tween var i ous spec i mens of law are dif fer ences be tween to kens of the same type and which are sep a rate types. This means that the prob lems iden ti fied at the level of gen eral ju ris pru dence can not be avoided by at tempt ing to de fend descriptivism on a smaller scale. Dis tin guish ing be tween dif fer ent types within the cat e gory "law" will re quire an under ly ing the ory, which brings back the prob lem of cir cu larity men tioned above.
Even if we man age to over come this prob lem, it will still re quire a ma jor change in descriptivism. Re call that one of the two cen tral el e ments of descriptivism is that it of fers a gen eral de scrip tion of law. This is no small thing. De scribing the im por tant el e ments of par tic u lar le gal sys tems is exactly the sort of thing descriptivists them selves claim not to be do ing, the sort of task they con sider as the ap pro pri ate do main of em pir i cal so cial sci en tists. 12 There fore, nar row ing down the aims of de scrip tive ju ris pru dence in this way will raise doubts on its very point and will pre sum ably call for some fun da men tal changes in the meth ods le gal phi los ophers use. In par tic u lar, one would ex pect their work to be much more grounded in em pir i cal facts on par tic u lar le gal sys tems than it cur rently is. 
VI
I turn now to epistemic de fi ciency and com plex ity as possi ble rec on cil i a tions of per sis tent ju ris pru den tial dis agreements with descriptivism. Let me start with the first pos si bility, be cause it is a more ev i dently im plau si ble ex pla na tion for ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment. As far as I know, there are no con sti tu tions to be un earthed, stat utes whose con tent awaits in ter pre ta tion, or any other miss ing facts that if found would bring any open ju ris pru den tial ques tion to an end. To be sure, we do not know ev ery thing that can be known about all his tor i cal forms of law, just as we do not know many as pects of life in an cient times. But that is besides my point, be cause there is no sug ges tion that cer tain cur rently open ju ris pru den tial dis putes on the na ture of law would be re solved if only we had some in for ma tion about ancient le gal sys tems we cur rently lack. That is not just my own view. Un like cases of sci en tific epistemic de fi ciency when sci en tists can tell what ev i dence will re solve an open sci en tific dis pute (and when pos si ble they of ten go on to construct and con duct ex per i ments in an at tempt to gather it), I know of no sug ges tion from any ju ris pru den tial descriptivist that any pres ently open ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment will be re solved if only cer tain facts be come known.
It is this cru cial dif fer ence be tween ju ris pru den tial and sci en tific dis agree ments that ex plains why Scott Shapiro's re cent at tempt to ex plain ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments is in apt. Ac cord ing to Shapiro, "[j]ust as two de tec tives can dis agree about which sus pect com mit ted the crime, two phi los o phers can dis agree about what makes an en tity the thing that it is". 13 In his sce nario dis agree ment is pos si ble be cause it is the re sult of epistemic de fi ciency. Even if the avail able ev i dence ren ders sev eral pos si ble sce nar ios equally plau si ble, we can con ceive of ad di tional ev i dence that would have shown which of the de tec tives (if any) is right. In his sce nario, for ex am ple, a se cu rity cam era in - stalled at the crime scene could have re solved the de tectives' dis agree ments. There is sim ply noth ing com pa ra ble in ju ris pru dence.
Com plex ity is a more se ri ous pos si bil ity. Here, if you wish, the source of the dis agree ment is not the in suf fi ciency of data but the in suf fi ciency of le gal the o rists' cog ni tive ca pac i ties. Ob vi ously, this is a pos si bil ity that can never be ruled out, but I think it pro vides lit tle as sis tance to de fend ers of descriptivism. To see why, we need to look a bit more closely at the po ten tial sources of com plex ity and their im pli ca tions for ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment. In gen eral we can dis tinguish be tween com plex ity of the explanandum and com plexity of the explanans. I be gin with the for mer.
Though su per fi cially ap peal ing, the com plex ity of the explanandum ac tu ally fits ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments rather poorly. Le gal phe nom ena are in deed mul ti fac eted and var ied; none the less, their com plex ity should not be exag ger ated. Law is not quan tum me chan ics (about which Rich ard Feynman is re puted to have said: "if you think you un der stand quan tum me chan ics you don't un der stand quan tum me chan ics"). When one ex am ines ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments, they are not nor mally ac cu sa tions of ig noring some facts or of leav ing out some as pect of a com plex phe nom e non, but are rather the re sult of chal leng ing a com pet ing ex pla na tion of the same, typ i cally not ex cep tionally com plex, set of facts. A re lated dif fi culty with this expla na tion lies not with what we see in ju ris pru den tial debates, but with what we do not. If it had re ally been the com plex ity of the ex plained phe nom ena that ac counted for ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment we would have ex pected to see the sort of prog ress we do see in the par a digm of "de scriptive" in qui ries, sci ence, where com plex the o ries are built up from an ac cu mu la tion of an swers to small-scale and typ ically less con tro ver sial ques tions. There is, how ever, no such ac cu mu la tion of ac cepted an swers in ju ris pru dence. I can not think of a sin gle small-scale prob lem that has been solved to (vir tu ally) ev ery one's sat is fac tion. In fact, there is not even agree ment on wrong an swers. Among prom i nent le gal phi los o phers to day some be lieve co er cion is es sen tial to law, oth ers do not; some be lieve that the gun man sit u ation writ large can un der cer tain sit u a tions be a le gal system, while oth ers deny this; some be lieve that mo ral ity is nec es sar ily con nected to law, oth ers firmly deny this. The list goes on and on. These dis agree ments are hard to square with the sug ges tion that the source of such disagree ments is due to the com plex ity of law.
There is a dif fer ent po ten tial source of le gal com plex ity that may be of greater ex plan a tory power, but un for tunately for descriptivists, if it is true, it un der mines descriptivism in a dif fer ent way. One rea son why law may be complex is that it was the prod uct of the work ings of many people in dif fer ent times and places, hold ing very dif fer ent and of ten con flict ing views on law, so ci ety, mor als and pol i tics. Their dif fer ent views have not just been ex og e nous eval u ations of le gal phe nom ena; rather, these be liefs in flu enced ac tions within the law and thereby helped shape what law is. This re sulted in a prac tice within which one finds, say, "positivistic" as pects along side "non-positivistic" ones, because those who give shape to le gal phe nom ena (leg is la tors, judges, law yers, lay peo ple) have re shaped le gal prac tice on the ba sis of their con flict ing be liefs. Un like the com plex ity in the prac ti cal as pects of law, which le gal phi los o phers tend to ig nore as ir rel e vant, this di ver sity of views touches on the very is sues they are con cerned to il lu mi nate. The differ ent at ti tudes of those in volved in the law lead to a so cial prac tice that is con stantly be ing pulled in dif fer ent di rections. Le gal phi los o phers typ i cally ig nore this di ver sity of views, treat ing, say, Cicero's claims about the na ture of law as ex ter nal ob ser va tions about the na ture of law (which they can then as sess as true or false), and not the statements of a le gal in sider whose be liefs also con trib uted to the con sti tu tion of what law is.
This com plex ity pro vides a straight for ward ex pla na tion for some ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments -dif fer ent descriptivists have their own views about law and they (nat u rally) highlight in their ac counts those fea tures that align with these views and ne glect those that do not-but in do ing so it also pro vides what may be the great est chal lenge to descriptivism. For if the pos si bil ity just out lined is true, con flict ing ju ris pru den tial descriptivists are all wrong for ig nor ing this com plex ity and of fer ing overly sim pli fied, in com plete, and for that rea son er ro ne ous, ac counts of law. In short, if law is com plex in this sense, then the overly neat and or ga nized ac counts le gal phi los o phers give us are not faith ful de scriptions of the na ture of law, but are ex pla na tions sim pli fied and san i tized to such a de gree that the re sult can not plausi bly be called a "de scrip tion" of their pur ported ob ject.
The only way to avoid this con clu sion is to ar gue that beyond all the dif fer ences among le gal prac ti tio ners there is a core that all agree on and that it is this core of le gal practice that le gal phi los o phers can and should de scribe. There are, how ever, at least three prob lems with this sug ges tion. First, this claim needs to be shown rather as sumed; second, it is not easy to both main tain this claim and the one that re main ing dis agree ments among le gal phi los o phers are about the de scrip tion of this sup pos edly un con tro ver sial core; and fi nally, this core, even if it ex ists, is likely to be so thin that it will not cap ture any thing that could be plau sibly called the "na ture" of law, which is what descriptivists pur port to be af ter.
What about the com plex ity of the explanans? There are con sid er able dif fi cul ties with this pos si bil ity as well. Le gal phi los o phers typ i cally leave out from their dis cus sions much of what makes law com plex. Ac cord ing to descriptivists the philo soph i cal ques tion of the na ture of law is under stood as the search for law's nec es sary fea tures or its ex is tence con di tions. Con se quently, much of the di ver sity (and hence com plex ity) of real-world le gal phe nom ena is off bounds as far as most le gal phi los o phers are con cerned. In fact, to the ex tent that the com plex ity of le gal phe nom ena still re mains a prob lem that leads to per sis tent ju ris pru -503 den tial dis agree ments, it casts doubt on the ap pro pri ateness of philo soph i cal method as a means for deal ing with the task of a de scrip tive ac count of law. Phi los o phy is not the only (and typ i cally not the pri mary) method for de scribing so cial phe nom ena (as op posed to the ques tion of the explain ing the on to log i cal sta tus of so cial phe nom ena, of what makes them pos si ble). If de scrip tive ju ris pru dence fails so spec tac u larly at pro vid ing de ter mi nate and agreed-upon an swers to the ques tion of de scrib ing the es sence of a famil iar so cial prac tice, this gives us rea son to doubt whether it is the right tool for the task. In other words, claim ing that ju ris pru dence is de scrip tive and ex plain ing ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments as a re sult of the com plex ity of law, when cou pled with the fail ure of this en ter prise to gen er ate uncon tro ver sial de scrip tions of even the most ba sic as pects of law, will tend to sug gest that the prob lem lies in the method used to de scribe the phe nom e non: spe cif i cally, the in ad e quacy of the fact-thin meth ods of le gal phi los o phers in ad dress ing and de scrib ing the fac tual com plex ity of the social phe nom ena they are in ves ti gat ing.
VII
The fol low ing ta ble sum ma rizes the dif fer ent ex pla na tions con sid ered in this es say for ex plain ing ju ris pru den tial disagree ments and the rea son why each of them un der mines descriptivism:
Ex pla na tion of the dis agree ment Prob lem for descriptivism
Evaluative moral dis agreement Descriptivism is straight for wardly false.
Evaluative epistemic disagree ments
De bates in ju ris pru dence are point less so long as the o rists do not find the right way of ex plaining law.
Ap par ent dis agree ment Im plau si ble as an ex pla na tion of dis agree ment; but if true disagree ment is point less and try ing to re solve the dis agree ment under mines the mo ti va tion for an alytic ju ris pru dence.
Epistemic de fi ciency
Un likely ex pla na tion of ju ris pruden tial dis agree ments.
Com plex ity of le gal phe nom ena Does not fit most ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments; and if true un dermines phi los o phy as a method for get ting to the truth.
If the ar gu ments just sum ma rized are along the right lines, we have rea son to doubt that the branch of ju ris prudence that pur ports to be de scrip tive is in deed so, be cause de scrip tive de bates only man i fest per sis tence un der cer tain con di tions, none of which per tains to ju ris pru den tial debates.
I con sider now sev eral pos si ble ob jec tions to my ar gument. The first, one that I treat briefly, is that even though each ex pla na tion con sid ered above in iso la tion can not explain why ju ris pru dence is de scrip tive, some com bi na tion of them can. Or it might be con tended that I failed to consider an ar gu ment for ex plain ing the per sis tence of ju rispru den tial dis agree ment that will sat isfy com mit ted descriptivists. Both chal lenges are, of course, pos si ble.
With out more, all I can say is that these chal lenges are empty with out fur ther de tails. In any case, even if ul timately un suc cess ful, the ar gu ment of this es say should prove help ful in mak ing sense of the ter rain of de scrip tive ju ris pru dence and for a more fruit ful dis cus sion of its merits.
The sec ond pos si ble ob jec tion, one that I en coun tered in one form or an other from sev eral read ers, is that my ar guments must be false, be cause if true, they bring down with them not just de scrip tive ju ris pru dence but the whole of phi los o phy. Af ter all, if there is one thing that has char acter ized phi los o phy through out all its his tory is the in trac tabil ity of its ques tions and the per sis tence of its de bates. Phrased in more pos i tive terms, it may be ar gued that there is some thing in her ently in trac ta ble about philo soph i cal debates, and that my ar gu ments miss this fea ture of philosoph i cal de bates by treat ing them as though they were empir i cal. The first thing to say in re sponse is that it is (usu ally) no an swer to a crime to say that oth ers are guilty of it as well; and la bel ing a de bate "philo soph i cal" does not re lieve it of nor ma tive stan dards rel e vant to other in qui ries. It bears ask ing why philo soph i cal de bates are per sis tent, why some age-old ques tions of phi los o phy are still with us. It is also no ta ble that those that do not, have usu ally been an swered by other dis ci plines. If all this means that a branch of phi los o phy, or even all of it, can not be sal vaged, so be it. But, in any case, I do not ac tu ally think that all of phi los o phy sim i larly af fected by my ar gu ments. Few phi loso phers these days, as far as I know, call their work "descrip tive." Even if we ex pand this cat e gory to mean "concep tual," then con cep tual anal y sis has met with hard times, from phi los o phers per haps more than any one else. It has its de fend ers too, but to ar gue that all philo soph i cal reflec tion is a form of con cep tual anal y sis (which is what this chal lenge amounts to) is an un likely claim. What ever may be the faults in those branches of phi los o phy that do not pur port to be de scrip tive, the ar gu ments pre sented in this es say do not af fect them.
More spe cif i cally, when con sid ered more closely, it is at least ar gu able that some of the re jected ex pla na tions for the per sis tence of ju ris pru den tial de bates are avail able for explain ing the per sis tence of other philo soph i cal de bates. Some de bates in phi los o phy prob a bly per sist be cause of epistemic de fi ciency (some ques tions in the phi los o phy of mind are likely ex am ples, as are some as pects in the de bate over free will). More im por tantly, the ar gu ments pre sented here do not af fect all branches of nor ma tive phi los o phy. If, for in stance, gen eral ju ris pru den tial ex pla na tions were mod eled on some thing like re flec tive equi lib rium, the ar gument pre sented here would have left it largely un scathed. (That is not to say that the method of re flec tive equi lib rium has not had its crit ics, only that those crit i cisms are un related to the ones raised here against descriptivism.) But to think of ju ris pru dence on the re flec tive equi lib rium model means think ing of it as a nor ma tive in quiry. True, re flec tive equi lib rium starts with pre vail ing un der stand ings of our prac tices and checks them against our in tu itions, but it is a nor ma tive en deavor that seeks to jus tify and im prove our prac tices. Fur ther, the method of re flec tive equi lib rium is jus ti fied for its abil ity to of fer re in ter pre ta tions of fa mil iar con cepts that are nor ma tively at trac tive, thereby pro vid ing a frame work for im prov ing hu man in sti tu tions. This is very dif fer ent from de scrip tive ju ris pru dence.
A dif fer ent ob jec tion is that I have missed my tar get, because in fact even descriptivists con cede the role of eval u ation in ju ris pru den tial in quiry: what they re ject is that those val ues are moral or po lit i cal. 14 Real ju ris pru den tial descriptivists, then, can ac cept that a main source of ju rispru den tial dis agree ment is evaluative, but deny that it is moral eval u a tion. Call this view "weak descriptivism". 15 For rea sons I ex plained in some de tail else where, I be lieve weak descriptivism is an un sta ble and in de fen si ble po si -
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Núm. 8, ene ro-di ciem bre de 2014, pp. 483-518 tion, 16 but we can largely ig nore these ar gu ments here. We can as sume that weak descriptivism is sound. In one recently pop u lar ver sion of weak descriptivism, ju ris pru dential the ory re quires mak ing judg ments of im por tance. 17 Though I have not en coun tered this spe cific ar gu ment from de fend ers of this view, one might try to ex plain the per sistence of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment on dis agree ments on what as pects of le gal phe nom ena are im por tant.
This sug ges tion may seem prom is ing at first, but it suffers from sev eral sig nif i cant dif fi cul ties. It is worth point ing out first it sim ply does not cor re spond to ju ris pru den tial dis course. Pick any of the most prom i nent works in ju rispru dence of the last few de cades: ar gu ments in it are not typ i cally that other le gal the o rists give too much or too lit tle weight to cer tain as pects of law; it is that com pet ing views are wrong. This is hard to rec on cile with the claim that evaluative dis agree ments in ju ris pru dence are all based on dif fer ent judg ments of im por tance. A sec ond dif fi culty with this sug ges tion is that dif fer ent em pha ses should not lead to con flicts. It is nor mally not dif fi cult to rec og nize that two ac counts that dif fer sim ply in how much they high light differ ent as pects of a sin gle phe nom e non. There fore, for this to count as the source of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments what is needed is the fur ther as sump tion that these dif ferent judg ments of im por tance have been glob ally mis taken for some thing else. As I see it, the most likely rea son why this might be so is if dif fer ent judg ments of im por tance is if they af fect le gal prac tice, i.e. if judg ing cer tain fea tures of law to be more im por tant than oth ers leads to a some what dif fer ent le gal prac tice. But this ex pla na tion is fun da mentally at odds with descriptivism, for it sug gests that le gal phi los o phers do not stand out side le gal prac tice merely observ ing and de scrib ing it, but rather (in ad ver tently or not) they take a stand -a nor ma tive stand-be tween dif fer ent pos si ble forms that le gal prac tice takes. That would show that judg ments of im por tance are in fact im plicit judg ments as to the rel a tive mer its of dif fer ent forms of le gal prac tice.
As sume, how ever, that I am wrong about all this too, i.e. that the source of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment is evaluative and ex clu sively con fined to dis agree ment over as sess ments of the im por tant fea tures of law. Ac cept ing this as the source of per sis tent ju ris pru den tial dis agreements will prove a pyr rhic vic tory for the descriptivist, for if this is the case, that will ren der ju ris pru den tial dis putes be yond ar gu ment. As far as I know there is no way of ad judi cat ing be tween judg ments of im por tance, for they are sub jec tive: if I think that cer tain fea tures of law that I find im por tant vin di cate "nat u ral law the ory" and you think that other fea tures that you find im por tant lead to "le gal pos i tivism", it is hard to see the point of us de bat ing our views, be cause each can only be as sessed rel a tive to those judgments of im por tance, and those judg ments them selves are be yond dis pute. Descriptivists must im plic itly ac cept this point, be cause if they did not, they would prob a bly ad dress this ques tion and sug gest a way of iden ti fy ing cor rect and in cor rect judg ments of im por tance in or der to re solve ju rispru den tial dis putes in this way. I know of no at tempt to do that. 18 
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Núm. 8, ene ro-di ciem bre de 2014, pp. 483-518 18 I raise in a note a re lated prob lem. Charles Tay lor has ar gued that judg ments of "im port" are em bed ded in a par tic u lar worldview. See Taylor, Charles, "Self-In ter pret ing An i mals", Hu man Agency and Lan guage: Philo soph i cal Pa pers 1, Cam bridge, Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1985, p. 45 . As the ti tle of his es say in di cates, this ar gu ment is par tic u larly pressing for those who claim (and this in cludes many descriptivists) that ju rispru dence is a hermeneutical en deavor con cerned with "self-un der standing". If Tay lor is right, the pos si bil ity of "ob jec tive" (in this con text: cross-cul tur ally-sim i lar or even in ter per son ally-sim i lar) judg ments of impor tance, and hence of ex pla na tion of so cial phe nom ena that de pend on such judg ments, looks rather sus pect.
Per haps, how ever, this fo cus on judg ments of im por tance is in suf fi ciently nar row. Per haps ju ris pru den tial dis agreements are the re sult of com pet ing epistemic val ues. This is a more plau si ble ver sion of weak descriptivism, but again I find it un likely that it is only epistemic val ues that ex plain ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments. They def i nitely do not seem that way. Those who pro pose this as the source of per sistent ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments need to show how evaluative dis agree ments about the na ture of a nor ma tive in sti tu tion such as law can steer clear of moral or po lit i cal con sid er ations. I would fur ther wish to see an ar gu ment dem on strat ing how vir tu ally all ju ris pru den tial dis agreements are the re sult of dis agree ment over epistemic val ues. It is worth high light ing in this con text that dis agree ments of this sort are likely to re sult from dif fer ent views about the proper way of ex plain ing hu man ac tion, and that such dis agree ments are them selves not eas ily dis en tan gled from moral and po lit i cal ques tions. (As an ex am ple con sider debates about the re la tion ship be tween ra tio nal ity and mo rality.)
How ever, for the sake of ar gu ment, as be fore, I am will ing to grant the as sump tion that moral evaluative con sid erations do not form any part of the evaluative con sid er ations that af fect per sis tent ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments. Once again, an im me di ate im pli ca tion of this view is that most de bates among le gal phi los o phers are mis guided, al though this time for a some what dif fer ent rea son than be fore: it follows from this ver sion of weak descriptivism that dis agreements among le gal phi los o phers that pur port to be about the na ture of law are ac tu ally com pet ing views about ex plana tion, ei ther in gen eral or of hu man ac tion. While I happen to think that some ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments are in fact the re sult of dif fer ent views on the na ture of (good) expla na tion, it is hard to see how a de fender of ju ris pru dential descriptivism will find so lace in this view. Ac cept ing it im plies that to the ex tent that ju ris pru den tial dis agreements are the re sult of epistemic evaluative dis agree ments, le gal phi los o phers should turn away from the de bates they have been en gaged in and turn to the mat ters that are really be hind their dis agree ments, i.e. the ap pro pri ate method for ex plain ing hu man be hav ior, ac tion, and institutions.
The sec ond po ten tial chal lenge to my ar gu ment is that the source of evaluative dis agree ment is epistemic de ficiency on mat ters of value. This is the pos si bil ity men tioned briefly at the be gin ning of the es say, ac cord ing to which evaluative dis agree ments are a spe cial case of epistemic defi ciency. I do not think this is a very pop u lar view, but it has its ad her ents; Ron ald Dworkin, for ex am ple, may have been one of them. As I un der stand him, Dworkin be lieves le gal and moral dis agree ments ex ist be cause we lack the pow ers of his imag i nary judge Her cu les, and cor re spondingly, that all such dis agree ments would have dis ap peared had we been om ni scient like him. Would adopt ing this view make a dif fer ence to the ques tion at hand? Tech ni cally, the an swer is clearly "No," be cause ju ris pru den tial dis agreements will still be evaluative, and more spe cif i cally, mor ally evaluative. More im por tantly, to try and ex plain the prev alence of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments within a descriptivist frame work by ap peal ing to this con sid er ation im plies that descriptivists should ded i cate all their ef forts to non-ju rispru den tial ques tions. On this view ju ris pru den tial de bates are eth i cal or metaethical de bates mas quer ad ing as de bates about the na ture of law and there is lit tle hope for one side con vinc ing the other of the truth of its views un til we find the truth re gard ing cer tain eth i cal ques tions. Put some what dif fer ently, ac cept ing this view im plies that ju ris pru den tial de bates should look much more like Dworkin's work in juris pru dence, work that has been, de cid edly and consciously, non-descriptivist. 19 VIII So far I have pre sented rea sons to doubt the claim that ju ris pru dence is de scrip tive and con sid ered sev eral pos si ble counter argu ments. I wish to con clude with a pos i tive ex plana tion of the de bates that make up what is said to be descrip tive, or con cep tual, ju ris pru dence in a way that will make sense of their per sis tence.
Call ing ju ris pru dence de scrip tive sug gests that there exists a well-de fined ob ject that ex ists be fore the in quiry. That is in deed the as sump tion, usu ally im plicit, one finds in the work of descriptivists. Raz, for in stance, has stated that it is a mis take to think that "le gal phi los o phy cre ates the concept of law" when "in fact it merely ex plains the con cept that ex ists in de pend ently of it." 20 We have seen, how ever, that be cause there is no clearly-de fined ob ject, de scrip tive ju ris pru dence suf fers from a fa tal flaw of cir cu lar ity, which can be avoided when we aban don this as sump tion. If we ac cept that law is a hu man cre ation, then what be longs in that cat e gory is it self de ter mined by hu man at ti tudes. Though this is al most a tru ism among con tem po rary le gal phi los o phers, es pe cially le gal positivists, the full im pli cations of this idea have not been con sid ered. The most signif i cant one for pres ent pur poses is that since (for the most part) hu mans have no need for a clear-cut clas si fi ca tion of law and non-law, there sim ply is no an swer within the object it self to many of the ques tions that have been at the heart of de scrip tive ju ris pru dence, be cause there are no (con sis tent) hu man at ti tudes about them. This im plies that there is no an swer to many of the "de scrip tive" ques tions at the heart of con tem po rary con cep tual ju ris pru dence -Ques tions like: Is law nec es sar ily co er cive? Can moral norms be in cor po rated into the law? Are sanc tions nec essary for law?-be cause hu mans have not had any need to come up with an swers to them. To give just one ex am ple, the claim that the con cept of law does not nec es sar ily involve sanc tions has been chal lenged us ing thought ex per iments in volv ing non-hu man so ci et ies. But since hu mans, whose at ti tudes con sti tute the ob ject on which le gal phi loso phers sup pos edly ap ply their con cep tual anal y sis skills, have not trou bled them selves with the ques tion of law in non-hu man so ci et ies (the law of hu man so ci et ies giv ing them enough to worry about), it is a mis take to draw any in fer ence from what ever it is one imag ines is the right answer to these thought ex per i ments, to any in quiry into the na ture of law.
The only way out of this is to try to de scribe not sim ply a hu man prac tice, but an ide al iza tion of it. Now, here there are two ways of iden ti fy ing that ideal. One is an at tempt to strip from the prac tice what the the o rist con sid ers its under ly ing ideal. That, I trust it is clear, in volves ex actly the nor ma tive in quiry that descriptivists claim is not part of their in quiry. The dif fi culty is that the prac tice underdetermines its ideal and that con se quently there is an in fi nite num ber of pos si ble ide al iza tions of it. The other pos si bil ity is that the ideal of law is it self an at ti tude the the o rist tries to iden tify. On this view real-life law is a pale im age of an ab stract idea of law that the hu mans whose at ti tudes have con sti tuted le gal prac tice have cre ated them with a cer tain ideal in mind. In that case, we might think of a "de scriptive," even "so cio log i cal" in quiry of this ideal. I take it that such ide als have in deed oc cu pied law yers and phi los ophers. The prob lem here, how ever, is not of a lack of an object to de scribe, but of a glut. His tory shows they have had many such ide als, and the choice among them in ev i ta bly takes us be yond de scrip tion.
All dif fer ent ways of un der stand ing ju ris pru den tial practice thus show it to in volve some kind of in ter pre ta tion of the prac tice, i.e. the at tempt to look at the prac tice and iden tify what is cen tral to it and why this is so. This ex plana tion seems plau si ble on its own: the most "de scrip tive" ju ris pru dence in volves the sift ing and or ga niz ing of cer tain facts as rel e vant, es sen tial, im por tant, il lu mi nat ing and so on, from an in fi nite num ber of facts. This pro cess is not descrip tive, for mak ing those judg ments re quires tak ing a certain nor ma tive per spec tive. It also pro vides a ready and sim ple ex pla na tion for our puz zle of per sis tent ju ris pru dential dis agree ment. In deed, it does so while also ex plain ing why such dis agree ments are of ten pre sented as though they are dis agree ment over a "de scrip tive" ques tion. This is so, be cause such ac counts ap pear to give us an ac count of what the prac tice "is," not what it should be. These com peting in ter pre ta tions are thus nor ma tive, grounded in whatever nor ma tive con sid er ations the the o rist more-or-less explic itly rec og nizes as rel e vant for this in quiry. The per sis tence of ju ris pru den tial dis agree ment is made pos sible by the fact that there is in de ter mi nacy at all lev els of this in quiry: of what be longs to the ob ject of in quiry, of the stan dards by which to as sess it, the con tent of those norma tive stan dards, the weight ing of such dif fer ent standards, and so on.
I thus reach, re ly ing on a some what dif fer ent ar gu ment, a con clu sion that is quite sim i lar to the one reached by Ron ald Dworkin. But Dworkin has made the fur ther claim that juris pru dence is po lit i cal in the sense that this shows that juris pru dence is part of po lit i cal phi los o phy. Is this ex tra step war ranted? If we agree that dif fer ent "de scrip tive" the o ries of law are in fact dif fer ent in ter pre ta tions of le gal prac tice, the ques tion re mains as to the rel e vant stan dard. In some loose and not very il lu mi nat ing way we can talk of here of "im portance" as the rel e vant stan dard, but if we try and con sider what is im por tant about law, it is safe to say, I think, without prej u dic ing my an swer in fa vor of any view, that law is re lated to con cepts like au thor ity, mo ral ity, co er cion, and legit i macy. All these are po lit i cal con cepts. Thus, any in ter pre -ta tion of what law is (what is im por tant, il lu mi nat ing, central, and so on about it) will re quire ex plain ing how these con cepts (or at least some of them) re late to law and to each other. Even if there is a de scrip tive com po nent to such an in quiry, it is prob a bly a mi nor part of it, and can not be the whole of it. Thus, even if not all in ter pre ta tion of so cial practices is po lit i cal, the in ter pre ta tion of law is.
IX
An out sider may still won der why any of this mat ters. If what most le gal phi los o phers have been do ing is not "descrip tive" they can go on do ing what they have done all along but change the la bel. I must clar ify there fore that my real con cern is not with the la bel. My hope is that this essay will per suade read ers of the need to turn away from descriptivism, be cause I be lieve descriptivism has led le gal phi los o phers to spend an in or di nate amount of time and en ergy on the wrong ques tions, and, per haps worse, try to an swer them, in ways that did not con trib ute to better under stand ing law. Given what I have just said, this claim requires some ex pla na tion. Af ter all, if, as I have just contended, ju ris pru den tial de bates re ally are some thing dif fer ent from what those en gaged in them claim them to be, then the prob lem may not be with the de bates themselves, only with their char ac ter iza tion. But the char ac teriza tion of de bates as con cep tual does have very del e te ri ous ef fects on ju ris pru dence. They in volve many schol ars engaged in ques tions for which the char ac ter iza tion of fered here shows there is no "de scrip tive" or "con cep tual" an swer; they deepen the sep a ra tion of ju ris pru dence from po lit i cal phi los o phy and en cour age the view that in an swer ing questions in ju ris pru dence one should, as much as pos si ble, stay clear of nor ma tive de bates. As a re sult the de scrip tive bias in con tem po rary ju ris pru dence has led to the wrong an swers to fun da men tal ques tions in ju ris pru dence and to the iso la tion of ju ris pru dence from le gal prac tice, from the rest of le gal ac a de mia, and even from the rest of contemporary phi los o phy.
Part of the dom i nance of con cep tual ju ris pru dence has in volved the cre ation of an in vented his tory, in which philos o phers of past cen tu ries, es pe cially those con sid ered found ers of le gal pos i tiv ism, have had their phi los o phy of law made to fit descriptivist stric tures lead ing to char ac teriza tions of their thought that bear only a ten u ous re la tionship with their ac tual ideas. This is true of Hobbes, of Bentham, even to some ex tent of John Aus tin. This es say does not at tempt to spell out what an al ter na tive view of juris pru dence should look like, but these ex am ples (to which one can add many more) suf fice to es tab lish one point: that the range of pos si bil i ties and views one could find in le gal phi los o phy is as wide as what one finds within po lit i cal philos o phy. Un der this char ac ter iza tion of ju ris pru dence the puz zle of per sis tent ju ris pru den tial dis agree ments will no lon ger be a mys tery, or at least not a greater mys tery than the ex is tence of per sis tent dis agree ments among po lit i cal phi los o phers. More im por tantly, thus un der stood, the point of en gag ing in these per sis tent de bates will be come much eas ier to un der stand. On this view ju ris pru den tial ar guments will be un der stood not as at tempts to de scribe law, but rather as at tempts to per suade oth ers of the su pe ri or ity of a par tic u lar way of un der stand ing and or ga niz ing le gal phe nom ena based on a broader view on how life in a po lit ical com mu nity should be lived and the role law should play in it. Some works will be "in ter pre tive" in that they will try to work by of fer ing a po lit i cally-in formed read ing of ex ist ing prac tices; other works will be purely "pre scrip tive" or "norma tive" as they will try to ar tic u late a char ac ter iza tion of jus ti fied le gal prac tices in de pend ently of such prac tices. None should be "de scrip tive." 
